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Terror in Mumbai
Nov 27, 2008 @ 11:47
http://search.twitter.com/search?q=%23mumbai
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http://search.twitter.com/search?q=%23mumbai
Those who are looking for live update on Terror in Mumbai
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Ehsaan
EhsaanNov 27, 2008 @ 11:47
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Re: Terror in Mumbai
Post 1
Nov 27, 2008 @ 21:42
If you are following the situation in Mumbai and the possible political ramifications, this is a review of the situation (an possible outcomes on a Regional and International basis) from www.stratfor.com an American think tank that follows International politics and terrorism.
Summary
If the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Islamist militants as it appears, the Indian government will have little choice, politically speaking, but to blame them on Pakistan. That will in turn spark a crisis between the two nuclear rivals that will draw the United States into the fray.
Analysis
At this point the situation on the ground in Mumbai remains unclear following the militant attacks of Nov. 26. But in order to understand the geopolitical significance of what is going on, it is necessary to begin looking beyond this event at what will follow. Though the situation is still in motion, the likely consequences of the attack are less murky.
We will begin by assuming that the attackers are Islamist militant groups operating in India, possibly with some level of outside support from Pakistan. We can also see quite clearly that this was a carefully planned, well-executed attack.
Given this, the Indian government has two choices. First, it can simply say that the perpetrators are a domestic group. In that case, it will be held accountable for a failure of enormous proportions in security and law enforcement. It will be charged with being unable to protect the public. On the other hand, it can link the attack to an outside power: Pakistan. In that case it can hold a nation-state responsible for the attack, and can use the crisis atmosphere to strengthen the government’s internal position by invoking nationalism. Politically this is a much preferable outcome for the Indian government, and so it is the most likely course of action. This is not to say that there are no outside powers involved — simply that, regardless of the ground truth, the Indian government will claim there were.
That, in turn, will plunge India and Pakistan into the worst crisis they have had since 2002. If the Pakistanis are understood to be responsible for the attack, then the Indians must hold them responsible, and that means they will have to take action in retaliation — otherwise, the Indian government’s domestic credibility will plunge. The shape of the crisis, then, will consist of demands that the Pakistanis take immediate steps to suppress Islamist radicals across the board, but particularly in Kashmir. New Delhi will demand that this action be immediate and public. This demand will come parallel to U.S. demands for the same actions, and threats by incoming U.S. President Barack Obama to force greater cooperation from Pakistan.
If that happens, Pakistan will find itself in a nutcracker. On the one side, the Indians will be threatening action — deliberately vague but menacing — along with the Americans. This will be even more intense if it turns out, as currently seems likely, that Americans and Europeans were being held hostage (or worse) in the two hotels that were attacked. If the attacks are traced to Pakistan, American demands will escalate well in advance of inauguration day.
There is a precedent for this. In 2002 there was an attack on the Indian parliament in Mumbai by Islamist militants linked to Pakistan. A near-nuclear confrontation took place between India and Pakistan, in which the United States brokered a stand-down in return for intensified Pakistani pressure on the Islamists. The crisis helped redefine the Pakistani position on Islamist radicals in Pakistan.
In the current iteration, the demands will be even more intense. The Indians and Americans will have a joint interest in forcing the Pakistani government to act decisively and immediately. The Pakistani government has warned that such pressure could destabilize Pakistan. The Indians will not be in a position to moderate their position, and the Americans will see the situation as an opportunity to extract major concessions. Thus the crisis will directly intersect U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan.
It is not clear the degree to which the Pakistani government can control the situation. But the Indians will have no choice but to be assertive, and the United States will move along the same line. Whether it is the current government in India that reacts, or one that succeeds doesn’t matter. Either way, India is under enormous pressure to respond. Therefore the events point to a serious crisis not simply between Pakistan and India, but within Pakistan as well, with the government caught between foreign powers and domestic realities. Given the circumstances, massive destabilization is possible — never a good thing with a nuclear power.
This is thinking far ahead of the curve, and is based on an assumption of the truth of something we don’t know for certain yet, which is that the attackers were Muslims and that the Pakistanis will not be able to demonstrate categorically that they weren’t involved. Since we suspect they were Muslims, and since we doubt the Pakistanis can be categorical and convincing enough to thwart Indian demands, we suspect that we will be deep into a crisis within the next few days, very shortly after the situation on the ground clarifies itself.
Summary
If the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Islamist militants as it appears, the Indian government will have little choice, politically speaking, but to blame them on Pakistan. That will in turn spark a crisis between the two nuclear rivals that will draw the United States into the fray.
Analysis
At this point the situation on the ground in Mumbai remains unclear following the militant attacks of Nov. 26. But in order to understand the geopolitical significance of what is going on, it is necessary to begin looking beyond this event at what will follow. Though the situation is still in motion, the likely consequences of the attack are less murky.
We will begin by assuming that the attackers are Islamist militant groups operating in India, possibly with some level of outside support from Pakistan. We can also see quite clearly that this was a carefully planned, well-executed attack.
Given this, the Indian government has two choices. First, it can simply say that the perpetrators are a domestic group. In that case, it will be held accountable for a failure of enormous proportions in security and law enforcement. It will be charged with being unable to protect the public. On the other hand, it can link the attack to an outside power: Pakistan. In that case it can hold a nation-state responsible for the attack, and can use the crisis atmosphere to strengthen the government’s internal position by invoking nationalism. Politically this is a much preferable outcome for the Indian government, and so it is the most likely course of action. This is not to say that there are no outside powers involved — simply that, regardless of the ground truth, the Indian government will claim there were.
That, in turn, will plunge India and Pakistan into the worst crisis they have had since 2002. If the Pakistanis are understood to be responsible for the attack, then the Indians must hold them responsible, and that means they will have to take action in retaliation — otherwise, the Indian government’s domestic credibility will plunge. The shape of the crisis, then, will consist of demands that the Pakistanis take immediate steps to suppress Islamist radicals across the board, but particularly in Kashmir. New Delhi will demand that this action be immediate and public. This demand will come parallel to U.S. demands for the same actions, and threats by incoming U.S. President Barack Obama to force greater cooperation from Pakistan.
If that happens, Pakistan will find itself in a nutcracker. On the one side, the Indians will be threatening action — deliberately vague but menacing — along with the Americans. This will be even more intense if it turns out, as currently seems likely, that Americans and Europeans were being held hostage (or worse) in the two hotels that were attacked. If the attacks are traced to Pakistan, American demands will escalate well in advance of inauguration day.
There is a precedent for this. In 2002 there was an attack on the Indian parliament in Mumbai by Islamist militants linked to Pakistan. A near-nuclear confrontation took place between India and Pakistan, in which the United States brokered a stand-down in return for intensified Pakistani pressure on the Islamists. The crisis helped redefine the Pakistani position on Islamist radicals in Pakistan.
In the current iteration, the demands will be even more intense. The Indians and Americans will have a joint interest in forcing the Pakistani government to act decisively and immediately. The Pakistani government has warned that such pressure could destabilize Pakistan. The Indians will not be in a position to moderate their position, and the Americans will see the situation as an opportunity to extract major concessions. Thus the crisis will directly intersect U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan.
It is not clear the degree to which the Pakistani government can control the situation. But the Indians will have no choice but to be assertive, and the United States will move along the same line. Whether it is the current government in India that reacts, or one that succeeds doesn’t matter. Either way, India is under enormous pressure to respond. Therefore the events point to a serious crisis not simply between Pakistan and India, but within Pakistan as well, with the government caught between foreign powers and domestic realities. Given the circumstances, massive destabilization is possible — never a good thing with a nuclear power.
This is thinking far ahead of the curve, and is based on an assumption of the truth of something we don’t know for certain yet, which is that the attackers were Muslims and that the Pakistanis will not be able to demonstrate categorically that they weren’t involved. Since we suspect they were Muslims, and since we doubt the Pakistanis can be categorical and convincing enough to thwart Indian demands, we suspect that we will be deep into a crisis within the next few days, very shortly after the situation on the ground clarifies itself.
The text you are quoting:
If you are following the situation in Mumbai and the possible political ramifications, this is a review of the situation (an possible outcomes on a Regional and International basis) from www.stratfor.com an American think tank that follows International politics and terrorism.
Summary
If the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Islamist militants as it appears, the Indian government will have little choice, politically speaking, but to blame them on Pakistan. That will in turn spark a crisis between the two nuclear rivals that will draw the United States into the fray.
Analysis
At this point the situation on the ground in Mumbai remains unclear following the militant attacks of Nov. 26. But in order to understand the geopolitical significance of what is going on, it is necessary to begin looking beyond this event at what will follow. Though the situation is still in motion, the likely consequences of the attack are less murky.
We will begin by assuming that the attackers are Islamist militant groups operating in India, possibly with some level of outside support from Pakistan. We can also see quite clearly that this was a carefully planned, well-executed attack.
Given this, the Indian government has two choices. First, it can simply say that the perpetrators are a domestic group. In that case, it will be held accountable for a failure of enormous proportions in security and law enforcement. It will be charged with being unable to protect the public. On the other hand, it can link the attack to an outside power: Pakistan. In that case it can hold a nation-state responsible for the attack, and can use the crisis atmosphere to strengthen the government’s internal position by invoking nationalism. Politically this is a much preferable outcome for the Indian government, and so it is the most likely course of action. This is not to say that there are no outside powers involved — simply that, regardless of the ground truth, the Indian government will claim there were.
That, in turn, will plunge India and Pakistan into the worst crisis they have had since 2002. If the Pakistanis are understood to be responsible for the attack, then the Indians must hold them responsible, and that means they will have to take action in retaliation — otherwise, the Indian government’s domestic credibility will plunge. The shape of the crisis, then, will consist of demands that the Pakistanis take immediate steps to suppress Islamist radicals across the board, but particularly in Kashmir. New Delhi will demand that this action be immediate and public. This demand will come parallel to U.S. demands for the same actions, and threats by incoming U.S. President Barack Obama to force greater cooperation from Pakistan.
If that happens, Pakistan will find itself in a nutcracker. On the one side, the Indians will be threatening action — deliberately vague but menacing — along with the Americans. This will be even more intense if it turns out, as currently seems likely, that Americans and Europeans were being held hostage (or worse) in the two hotels that were attacked. If the attacks are traced to Pakistan, American demands will escalate well in advance of inauguration day.
There is a precedent for this. In 2002 there was an attack on the Indian parliament in Mumbai by Islamist militants linked to Pakistan. A near-nuclear confrontation took place between India and Pakistan, in which the United States brokered a stand-down in return for intensified Pakistani pressure on the Islamists. The crisis helped redefine the Pakistani position on Islamist radicals in Pakistan.
In the current iteration, the demands will be even more intense. The Indians and Americans will have a joint interest in forcing the Pakistani government to act decisively and immediately. The Pakistani government has warned that such pressure could destabilize Pakistan. The Indians will not be in a position to moderate their position, and the Americans will see the situation as an opportunity to extract major concessions. Thus the crisis will directly intersect U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan.
It is not clear the degree to which the Pakistani government can control the situation. But the Indians will have no choice but to be assertive, and the United States will move along the same line. Whether it is the current government in India that reacts, or one that succeeds doesn’t matter. Either way, India is under enormous pressure to respond. Therefore the events point to a serious crisis not simply between Pakistan and India, but within Pakistan as well, with the government caught between foreign powers and domestic realities. Given the circumstances, massive destabilization is possible — never a good thing with a nuclear power.
This is thinking far ahead of the curve, and is based on an assumption of the truth of something we don’t know for certain yet, which is that the attackers were Muslims and that the Pakistanis will not be able to demonstrate categorically that they weren’t involved. Since we suspect they were Muslims, and since we doubt the Pakistanis can be categorical and convincing enough to thwart Indian demands, we suspect that we will be deep into a crisis within the next few days, very shortly after the situation on the ground clarifies itself.
Verbier, Nov 27, 2008 @ 21:42
Summary
If the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Islamist militants as it appears, the Indian government will have little choice, politically speaking, but to blame them on Pakistan. That will in turn spark a crisis between the two nuclear rivals that will draw the United States into the fray.
Analysis
At this point the situation on the ground in Mumbai remains unclear following the militant attacks of Nov. 26. But in order to understand the geopolitical significance of what is going on, it is necessary to begin looking beyond this event at what will follow. Though the situation is still in motion, the likely consequences of the attack are less murky.
We will begin by assuming that the attackers are Islamist militant groups operating in India, possibly with some level of outside support from Pakistan. We can also see quite clearly that this was a carefully planned, well-executed attack.
Given this, the Indian government has two choices. First, it can simply say that the perpetrators are a domestic group. In that case, it will be held accountable for a failure of enormous proportions in security and law enforcement. It will be charged with being unable to protect the public. On the other hand, it can link the attack to an outside power: Pakistan. In that case it can hold a nation-state responsible for the attack, and can use the crisis atmosphere to strengthen the government’s internal position by invoking nationalism. Politically this is a much preferable outcome for the Indian government, and so it is the most likely course of action. This is not to say that there are no outside powers involved — simply that, regardless of the ground truth, the Indian government will claim there were.
That, in turn, will plunge India and Pakistan into the worst crisis they have had since 2002. If the Pakistanis are understood to be responsible for the attack, then the Indians must hold them responsible, and that means they will have to take action in retaliation — otherwise, the Indian government’s domestic credibility will plunge. The shape of the crisis, then, will consist of demands that the Pakistanis take immediate steps to suppress Islamist radicals across the board, but particularly in Kashmir. New Delhi will demand that this action be immediate and public. This demand will come parallel to U.S. demands for the same actions, and threats by incoming U.S. President Barack Obama to force greater cooperation from Pakistan.
If that happens, Pakistan will find itself in a nutcracker. On the one side, the Indians will be threatening action — deliberately vague but menacing — along with the Americans. This will be even more intense if it turns out, as currently seems likely, that Americans and Europeans were being held hostage (or worse) in the two hotels that were attacked. If the attacks are traced to Pakistan, American demands will escalate well in advance of inauguration day.
There is a precedent for this. In 2002 there was an attack on the Indian parliament in Mumbai by Islamist militants linked to Pakistan. A near-nuclear confrontation took place between India and Pakistan, in which the United States brokered a stand-down in return for intensified Pakistani pressure on the Islamists. The crisis helped redefine the Pakistani position on Islamist radicals in Pakistan.
In the current iteration, the demands will be even more intense. The Indians and Americans will have a joint interest in forcing the Pakistani government to act decisively and immediately. The Pakistani government has warned that such pressure could destabilize Pakistan. The Indians will not be in a position to moderate their position, and the Americans will see the situation as an opportunity to extract major concessions. Thus the crisis will directly intersect U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan.
It is not clear the degree to which the Pakistani government can control the situation. But the Indians will have no choice but to be assertive, and the United States will move along the same line. Whether it is the current government in India that reacts, or one that succeeds doesn’t matter. Either way, India is under enormous pressure to respond. Therefore the events point to a serious crisis not simply between Pakistan and India, but within Pakistan as well, with the government caught between foreign powers and domestic realities. Given the circumstances, massive destabilization is possible — never a good thing with a nuclear power.
This is thinking far ahead of the curve, and is based on an assumption of the truth of something we don’t know for certain yet, which is that the attackers were Muslims and that the Pakistanis will not be able to demonstrate categorically that they weren’t involved. Since we suspect they were Muslims, and since we doubt the Pakistanis can be categorical and convincing enough to thwart Indian demands, we suspect that we will be deep into a crisis within the next few days, very shortly after the situation on the ground clarifies itself.
Verbier, Nov 27, 2008 @ 21:42
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Re: Terror in Mumbai
Post 2
Nov 28, 2008 @ 06:34
Thanks guys for the sources...
The Guardian and other news outlets are commenting on the usefulness of Twitter in this case, even though some of the information was not confirmed or borne out by facts on the ground.
As for Stratfor, well it is less of a think tank and more of a couple of professional analysts spinning of the facts -- more like crystal ball gazing... that is not intelligencein any real sense of the term.
Real analysts take time to assess the situation avoid making prognostications until the facts on the ground are known. I think analysts and reporters with very deep experience in the region are much more reliable and first-hand sources of knowledge.
All that being said, my sympathies are with the families and friends of the victims of this terrible crime.
The text you are quoting:
Thanks guys for the sources...
The Guardian and other news outlets are commenting on the usefulness of Twitter in this case, even though some of the information was not confirmed or borne out by facts on the ground.
As for Stratfor, well it is less of a think tank and more of a couple of professional analysts spinning of the facts -- more like crystal ball gazing... that is not intelligencein any real sense of the term.
Real analysts take time to assess the situation avoid making prognostications until the facts on the ground are known. I think analysts and reporters with very deep experience in the region are much more reliable and first-hand sources of knowledge.
All that being said, my sympathies are with the families and friends of the victims of this terrible crime.
Translator, Nov 28, 2008 @ 06:34
Your Reply:
Only members can see names and photos
Re: Terror in Mumbai
Post 3
Nov 28, 2008 @ 07:05
Mumbai attacks show method amid madness
| By Sumantra Bose London School of Economics |
India's cities are no strangers to indiscriminate terror attacks. Such attacks have occurred regularly, and with steadily increasing frequency, in recent years.
Mumbai, India's financial capital, has been targeted before.
In March 1993, a series of car bombs were detonated at public landmarks across the city, including the stock exchange, killing 257 people.
Those attacks, in which the city's underworld played a key role, followed Hindu-Muslim violence in the city during December 1992 and January 1993. Working-class Muslims were the principal victims, often shot at point-blank range by members of the city's police force.
In July 2006, a series of bombs planted on Mumbai's commuter train network killed 183 people.
Other Indian cities have been regularly targeted as well, particularly Delhi, the capital.
In October 2005 bombs exploded in crowded Delhi markets on the eve of the festive day Diwali, the festival of lights. More than 60 people were killed.
Most recently, in July 2008, bombs exploded at a number of congested public locations in Ahmedabad, the capital of the western state of Gujarat.
Gujarat, one of India's most prosperous states, saw large-scale killings of Muslims in 2002 after an arson attack on a train in the state killed 59 Hindu nationalist activists.
More than 50 people were killed in the Ahmedabad bombings.
A previously unknown group, the Indian Mujahideen, claimed responsibility.
The Ahmedabad attacks were particularly vicious in that bombs were detonated outside the emergency facilities of city hospitals just as people injured in other explosions were being brought in by ambulances.
Frontal assault
So what is new about Mumbai, November 2008?
The obvious novelty is the use of frontal assault tactics instead of timed explosive devices.
This is new in the urban Indian context. There was one notable exception - an attack by a five-man squad armed with rifles and grenades on India's Parliament in New Delhi in December 2001.
The attackers were narrowly prevented by alert staff from gaining access to the building, where hundreds of parliamentarians and ministers were attending a session.
They were gunned down near the entrance by security personnel after an hour-long battle.
Nine guards and parliament stewards also died.
This attack led to the crisis of 2002 between India and Pakistan.
The Indian government blamed Pakistani religious radicals, and embarked on a major military build-up on the border with Pakistan, to which Pakistan responded with its own mobilisation.
The stand-off eventually wound down later in 2002 after months of tension and brinkmanship.
But frontal assaults, usually carried out by two-man teams firing semi-automatic rifles and lobbing grenades, were the favoured tactic of the insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir between 1999 and 2003.
Fidayeen technique
Scores of such attacks were carried out by "fidayeen" (literally "death-defying") squads in Indian-administered Kashmir during that period.
In many instances, these attacks led to confrontations lasting anywhere between 24 and 72 hours between the raiders and security forces, who were often constrained by the presence of trapped civilians.
Most of the locations targeted were Indian military and police installations in the Kashmir Valley, particularly in the regional capital Srinagar.
But some attacks targeted civilians, especially in and around the Hindu-majority city of Jammu, in the southern part of Indian-administered Kashmir.
The perpetrators were not members of the main homegrown Kashmiri insurgent group, the Hizb-ul Mujahideen ("Warriors of the Faith").
The fidayeen technique - a rudimentary form of "shock and awe" warfare - was introduced into Kashmir by Pakistani radical organisations that entered the Kashmir insurgency from the mid-1990s onwards.
The large majority of fidayeen attacks in Kashmir were perpetrated by one such organisation, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, headquartered in Pakistan and founded and led by Pakistani religious radicals.
The Lashkar-e Toiba did over time recruit a handful of local Kashmiris as fidayeen cadre, but most of the attackers were Pakistani nationals who had crossed into Indian-administered Kashmir.
Fidayeen attacks have died down in Kashmir since India-Pakistan relations thawed from 2004 onward.
But the deployment of exactly the same tactic in central Mumbai shows that this technique has now found a new and even more dangerous theatre in which to operate.
Method
The tactic is thus not without precedent, but the mayhem in Mumbai may nonetheless mark a new chapter in the evolution of urban terrorism in India.
Bombs planted in markets and on commuter trains kill and maim working-class and middle-class Indians.
The gunmen who attacked two luxury hotels, and a fashionable cafe frequented by visiting Westerners, have brought the "war" - as they see it - to India's elite class, and to affluent Westerners living in or visiting India's most cosmopolitan city.
If reports that the gunmen specifically looked for American and British citizens to take hostage are true, it would suggest that this terrorist spectacular had little to do with the prejudice and discrimination many Muslims do encounter in India.
It is tempting to label the attackers as "crazies". But such a dismissive appellation may be misplaced.
It is more than likely that the masterminds are seasoned operatives and that the foot-soldiers, young as they may have been, had undergone rigorous training for months, perhaps years.
The attacks also show every sign of having been designed to maximise media attention on a global scale.
In other words, there is a method to the madness.
Sumantra Bose is Professor of International and Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics. He is the author of Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka, published by Harvard University Press.
The text you are quoting:
Mumbai attacks show method amid madness
| By Sumantra Bose London School of Economics |
India's cities are no strangers to indiscriminate terror attacks. Such attacks have occurred regularly, and with steadily increasing frequency, in recent years.
Mumbai, India's financial capital, has been targeted before.
In March 1993, a series of car bombs were detonated at public landmarks across the city, including the stock exchange, killing 257 people.
Those attacks, in which the city's underworld played a key role, followed Hindu-Muslim violence in the city during December 1992 and January 1993. Working-class Muslims were the principal victims, often shot at point-blank range by members of the city's police force.
In July 2006, a series of bombs planted on Mumbai's commuter train network killed 183 people.
Other Indian cities have been regularly targeted as well, particularly Delhi, the capital.
In October 2005 bombs exploded in crowded Delhi markets on the eve of the festive day Diwali, the festival of lights. More than 60 people were killed.
Most recently, in July 2008, bombs exploded at a number of congested public locations in Ahmedabad, the capital of the western state of Gujarat.
Gujarat, one of India's most prosperous states, saw large-scale killings of Muslims in 2002 after an arson attack on a train in the state killed 59 Hindu nationalist activists.
More than 50 people were killed in the Ahmedabad bombings.
A previously unknown group, the Indian Mujahideen, claimed responsibility.
The Ahmedabad attacks were particularly vicious in that bombs were detonated outside the emergency facilities of city hospitals just as people injured in other explosions were being brought in by ambulances.
Frontal assault
So what is new about Mumbai, November 2008?
The obvious novelty is the use of frontal assault tactics instead of timed explosive devices.
This is new in the urban Indian context. There was one notable exception - an attack by a five-man squad armed with rifles and grenades on India's Parliament in New Delhi in December 2001.
The attackers were narrowly prevented by alert staff from gaining access to the building, where hundreds of parliamentarians and ministers were attending a session.
They were gunned down near the entrance by security personnel after an hour-long battle.
Nine guards and parliament stewards also died.
This attack led to the crisis of 2002 between India and Pakistan.
The Indian government blamed Pakistani religious radicals, and embarked on a major military build-up on the border with Pakistan, to which Pakistan responded with its own mobilisation.
The stand-off eventually wound down later in 2002 after months of tension and brinkmanship.
But frontal assaults, usually carried out by two-man teams firing semi-automatic rifles and lobbing grenades, were the favoured tactic of the insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir between 1999 and 2003.
Fidayeen technique
Scores of such attacks were carried out by "fidayeen" (literally "death-defying") squads in Indian-administered Kashmir during that period.
In many instances, these attacks led to confrontations lasting anywhere between 24 and 72 hours between the raiders and security forces, who were often constrained by the presence of trapped civilians.
Most of the locations targeted were Indian military and police installations in the Kashmir Valley, particularly in the regional capital Srinagar.
But some attacks targeted civilians, especially in and around the Hindu-majority city of Jammu, in the southern part of Indian-administered Kashmir.
The perpetrators were not members of the main homegrown Kashmiri insurgent group, the Hizb-ul Mujahideen ("Warriors of the Faith").
The fidayeen technique - a rudimentary form of "shock and awe" warfare - was introduced into Kashmir by Pakistani radical organisations that entered the Kashmir insurgency from the mid-1990s onwards.
The large majority of fidayeen attacks in Kashmir were perpetrated by one such organisation, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, headquartered in Pakistan and founded and led by Pakistani religious radicals.
The Lashkar-e Toiba did over time recruit a handful of local Kashmiris as fidayeen cadre, but most of the attackers were Pakistani nationals who had crossed into Indian-administered Kashmir.
Fidayeen attacks have died down in Kashmir since India-Pakistan relations thawed from 2004 onward.
But the deployment of exactly the same tactic in central Mumbai shows that this technique has now found a new and even more dangerous theatre in which to operate.
Method
The tactic is thus not without precedent, but the mayhem in Mumbai may nonetheless mark a new chapter in the evolution of urban terrorism in India.
Bombs planted in markets and on commuter trains kill and maim working-class and middle-class Indians.
The gunmen who attacked two luxury hotels, and a fashionable cafe frequented by visiting Westerners, have brought the "war" - as they see it - to India's elite class, and to affluent Westerners living in or visiting India's most cosmopolitan city.
If reports that the gunmen specifically looked for American and British citizens to take hostage are true, it would suggest that this terrorist spectacular had little to do with the prejudice and discrimination many Muslims do encounter in India.
It is tempting to label the attackers as "crazies". But such a dismissive appellation may be misplaced.
It is more than likely that the masterminds are seasoned operatives and that the foot-soldiers, young as they may have been, had undergone rigorous training for months, perhaps years.
The attacks also show every sign of having been designed to maximise media attention on a global scale.
In other words, there is a method to the madness.
Sumantra Bose is Professor of International and Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics. He is the author of Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka, published by Harvard University Press.
Translator, Nov 28, 2008 @ 07:05
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Re: Terror in Mumbai
Post 4
Nov 28, 2008 @ 11:39
